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Abstract: We propose a search equilibrium model in which homogenous firms post wages along
with a vacancy to attract job-seekers, while homogenous unemployed workers invest in
costly search. The key innovation relies on the organization of the search market and
the search behavior of the job-seekers. The search market is segmented by wage level,
and individuals are ubiquitous in the sense they can choose the amount of search eﬀort
spent on each (sub-)market. We show that there exists a non-degenerate equilibrium wage
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can be right-tailed. Our results are illustrated by an example originating a Beta wage
distribution.
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1 Introduction
This paper is a theoretical contribution to the literature on frictional wage dispersion. We
propose a search equilibrium model in which homogenous firms post wages along with a vacancy
to attract job-seekers, while homogenous unemployed workers invest in costly search. The key
innovation resides in the organization of the search market and the search behavior of the job-
seekers. The search market is segmented by wage, and individuals are ubiquitous: they can
choose the amount of search eﬀort spent on each (sub-)market. We show that there exists a
non-degenerate equilibrium wage distribution. The density of this wage distribution is hump-
shaped, and it can be right-tailed. Our results are illustrated by an example originating a Beta
wage distribution.
Why is it important? The size of residual wage dispersion in Mincerian wage regressions
has motivated a major interest for the understanding of the wage distribution for homogenous
labor. Search frictions are natural ingredients behind the failure of the law of one price. Hence,
modern theories of wage dispersion provide with search-theoretic microfoundations to residual
wage disparity. However, models of endogenous residual wage dispersion are more credible if
they are able to reproduce the properties of empirical wage distributions. Policy analysts can
be more confident in the predictions of such models regarding the impacts of unemployment
compensation, pay-roll taxes, and so on. Labor economists know that, and this is why models of
frictional wage distribution have been estimated on several occasions. As we discuss below, the
most used models do not feature empirically plausible wage distributions. In particular, they
do not predict the single-peakedness property. This particularity is usually pinned down by the
explicit modelling of heterogeneity. Our model claims that search frictions alone can originate
the single peak and the long right tail. This strengthens the point made by this particular field
of Labor Economics. As a by-product, it also means that our model is a natural candidate for
a structural estimation.
Our paper is based on two key assumptions. First, the search market is segmented by wage.
Jobs advertise wage, and two jobs paying diﬀerent wages belong to two diﬀerent search places.
Second, workers can choose their search investment on each market place. The technology
that transforms search investment into probability to match has marginal decreasing returns.
Workers can oﬀset a lower return at given search intensity by a lower search intensity. This
leads them to participate to a continuum of markets: they are, in this respect, ubiquitous.
In this setting, we obtain (i) a non-degenerate wage distribution, and (ii) a single-peaked
density of the wage distribution as natural outcomes.
The main results can be explained as follows. Workers rationally prospect jobs oﬀering
diﬀerent wages, and, therefore, firms oﬀer diﬀerent wages in equilibrium. The path of market-
specific search investment reflects the path of market-specific return to search. As the return to
search first increases, and then decreases with wage, search investment evolves non-monotonously
with the wage. In turn, the number of vacancies on each market responds to two eﬀects. First, it
tends to decrease with the wage, as paying higher wages must be compensated by lower search
costs, and thus longer job queues. Second, it tends to increase with the number of eﬀective
job-seekers, because recruitment rates depend on the ratio of vacancies to eﬀective number of
job-seekers. As a result, the number of vacancies tends to adopt the path of market-specific
search investment. The combination of these two eﬀects implies that the number of vacancies
is first increasing, and then decreasing in wage. It follows that the density of the wage oﬀer
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distribution is hump-shaped. Finally, the actual wage distribution can be deduced from the wage
oﬀer distribution and the knowledge of search investments. Its density is also single-peaked.
The wage distributions are also consistent with another property of empirical wage distrib-
utions: they are right-tailed. In our framework, we define a long right tail by the requirement
that the slope of the density of the distribution tends to zero as the wage becomes closer to the
upper bound of the support of the distribution. Then, we show that the density of the wage oﬀer
distribution is always right-tailed, while the density of the actual wage distribution may or may
not be right-tailed. All these properties are illustrated by an example, in which the matching
technology is Cobb-Douglas, and the eﬃciency of search eﬀort is isoelastic. In that case, the
wage oﬀer distribution and the actual wage oﬀer distribution follow Beta distributions.
Our paper matches two distinct ideas that have been investigated previously in the literature
on search unemployment: search is directed, and individuals participate to diﬀerent markets
simultaneously.
First, search is directed: the search market is segmented by wage, and individuals choose
which wage/job to prospect. Directed search models have been introduced first by Hosios (1990),
Montgomery (1991), and Moen (1997). In such models, workers can choose which jobs they send
their application to — or, alternatively, which market they prospect —, while the probability to
get a job is a decreasing function of the length of the job queue. Wage competition thus takes
place at the time of wage/market choice. In equilibrium, all wage oﬀers must yield the same
utility: if not, the jobs would not be prospected. This implies that the employment (recruitment)
probability is a decreasing (an increasing) function of the wage. Typically, there is a unique wage
oﬀer balancing workers’ marginal cost of searching the highest wage oﬀer (a lower employment
probability) and their marginal benefit (a better wage once employed). Our model departs from
usual directed search models because it features equilibrium wage dispersion. Interestingly,
search investment is the highest on the unique market that would have been prospected under
directed search assumption.
Second, individuals simultaneously participate to diﬀerent segments of the search market.
This idea is increasingly popular in models interested in two-sided heterogeneity. The search
market is segmented by job type, and workers choose the subset of sub-markets they participate.
In models devoted to overeducation, educated workers seek both complex and simple positions
while uneducated workers only search simple jobs (see Gautier, 2002). In models with multi-
dimensional skills, workers have a bundle of skills and participate to sub-markets on the basis
of comparative advantage (see Moscarini, 2001), or on the basis of their ability to perform on
the underlying technologies (see Charlot, Decreuse and Granier, 2005). Wage segmentation is a
natural extension of job segmentation: diﬀerent jobs are usually associated to diﬀerent wages, so
that individuals actually perceive job segmentation as wage segmentation. It is worth discussing
the impact of this assumption in terms of congestion externalities. In our model, vacancies
oﬀering diﬀerent wages do not create congestion eﬀects to each other. An additional oﬀer at
40,000 euro a year does not reduce the probability to fill a position oﬀering 30,000 euro a year
at given search intensities. However, the former oﬀer raises the welfare of the unemployed. In
response, the unemployed reduce their eﬀort to get the latter wage oﬀer. As a consequence,
the probability to fill the latter position is lower. This argument may seem a bit more diﬃcult
to accept when one imagines the case of a 40,000 euro a year position versus a 39,999 euro a
year position. Continuous segmentation is an assumption made for simplicity. We believe that
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accounting for discrete segmentation would not alter our main results1.
The shape of the wage distribution is a major property of our paper that distinguishes it from
other models of frictional wage dispersion. Such models belong to two main categories. First,
there are papers which introduce on-the-job search. If workers search on-the-job, reservation
wages are heterogenous. Under random search assumption, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) show
that this heterogeneity in reservation wages implies the existence of a non-degenerate wage
distribution. However, the density of the wage distribution is strictly increasing. De la Croix
and Shi (forthcoming) consider a directed search version. They show that the density of the wage
oﬀer distribution is strictly decreasing. In addition, at given initial wage, all workers prospect the
same jobs, which means they all receive the same wage in case of hiring. Second, there are papers
which introduce firm heterogeneity. Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) do so while estimating
the Burdett-Mortensen model. Mortensen (2000) examines productivity choices in the same
model. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a) also endogenize firm heterogeneity, but in a model
where employers can react to other firms approaching their workers by making a counteroﬀer
(see also Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002b). These papers manage to generate a hump-shaped
wage distribution. In a close framework, but with only ex-post heterogeneity (i.e. when the
quality of the match is revealed), Moscarini (2005) shows that it is possible to arrive at a wage
distribution with good empirical properties (unimodal, skewed, with a Paretian right tail) with
a simple Gaussian output noise. Our paper complements these studies by showing that search
frictions alone can generate a non-degenerate, single-peaked and right-tailed wage distribution.
The closest paper to ours are those on multiple applications. These papers modify the
matching technology so that a worker can receive multiple oﬀers at the same time. Thus, wage
competition takes place at the time of choosing between diﬀerent job oﬀers. This way to analyze
the search process is very close to Stigler (1961). In Acemoglu and Shimer (2000), firms post
wages and workers choose the number of costly oﬀers they receive. Acemoglu and Shimer show
that there is equilibrium wage dispersion. However, the density of the wage oﬀer distribution
is strictly decreasing with a mass point at its upper bound. In a similar vein, Galenianos and
Kircher (2005) — GK — consider the directed search model of Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman
(2005) in which firms post wages and the workers send multiple applications. Unlike Albrecht
et al., GK assume that firms commit to pay the posted wage irrespective of the number of
job oﬀers received by the applicant2. They also obtain a strictly decreasing density of the
wage distribution. In our paper, workers also send multiple applications and firms post wages.
However, there are two major diﬀerences with GK. First, individuals can only receive one oﬀer
at a time in our framework. Wage competition, therefore, takes place at the time of attracting
the job-seekers, and not once they have obtained several oﬀers. Second, the intensity of search
investment can vary with the wage. This is why there are only a few firms at the left and at
the right of the wage distribution, while the number of jobs decreases with the wage in GK. We
believe that allowing the workers to court the jobs with various degrees of aggressiveness is as
1Accounting for discrete segmentation would raise an important issue: how could one endogenize the diﬀerent
wage thresholds delimiting the diﬀerent market segments? Is this a problem of information (it may be necessary
to save on search costs to aggregate 30,000 euro to 35,000 euro positions), or preference (30,000 euro to 35,000
euro positions oﬀer similar standards of living, while a 40,000 euro position may change the life of the family).
Interestingly, models of segmentation by job type implicitly face similar problems: what is the diﬀerence between
simple jobs and complex jobs?
2Put otherwise, firms cannot react to other oﬀers by increasing their initial wage in GK, while they can in
Albrecht et al.
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important as allowing for multiple oﬀers at a time.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model in which workers can
choose their search intensity, but are bound to choose one and only one search market. We
call the associated equilibrium concept the localized search equilibrium, which is basically the
equilibrium of a standard directed search model with endogenous search intensity. In Section 3,
workers are no longer obliged to choose a particular market. We call the associated equilibrium
concept the ubiquitous search equilibrium. Section 4 studies the equilibrium wage distributions.
Section 5 discusses the eﬃciency of the decentralized outcome. Section 6 concludes.
All proofs are set forth in the appendix.
2 Localized search
What we call a localized search equilibrium is a version of Moen’s (1997) competitive search
equilibrium in which search eﬀort is made endogenous.
2.1 Search technology
Our model follows the lines of the wage posting search model developed, among others, by Moen
(1997) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999, 2000). In this framework, firms post vacancies with
non-negotiable wages. Workers, knowing all the posted wages, choose the amount of eﬀort they
will spend to search for a job. While making this choice, they are aware that if they decide to
search for a job oﬀering a wage w, they will compete with other workers seeking for the same
wage. Symmetrically, if a firm posts a vacancy associated with the wage w, it will compete to
attract workers with the other firms oﬀering the same wage. In other words, for each wage w,
workers face a specific queue length and vacant jobs have a specific probability to be filled. For
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999, 2000), such a representation of the search process recognizes that
the labor market is segmented by wages and that search frictions exist within each particular
sub-market (or island). Therefore, firms advertise wages, and all firms advertising a given wage
and all workers applying for these jobs form a sub-market.
As in Moen (1997), we assume that an unemployed person is bound to search for a job
on one and only one island. This is the reason why we use the term “localized” to label our
equilibrium concept. Thus, the search process consists in two stages: 1) firms post wages, 2)
each unemployed chooses on which sub-market she will search for a job and decides upon the
amount of search eﬀort she will spend on the previously chosen sub-market.
An unemployed person whose search eﬀort is s bears the cost c(s), but increasing eﬀort
provides more contacts with potential employers. In such a perspective, we will distinguish the
amount of search eﬀort from the eﬃciency of such an eﬀort. When a job-seeker invests an
amount of eﬀort s, the eﬃciency of this eﬀort is measured by the function x (s). In the sequel,
we make the following assumption on the functions c(s) and x(s) influencing the search process.
Assumption A1 The cost of eﬀort function c : [0,+∞) → [0,+∞) is strictly increasing,
convex, twice diﬀerentiable, and satisfies c (0) = 0, c0 (0) = c0 > 0, and c0 (+∞) = +∞.
The eﬃciency of eﬀort function x : [0,+∞)→ [0,+∞) is strictly increasing, strictly concave,
twice diﬀerentiable, and satisfies x (0) = 0, x0 (0) = +∞, and x0 (+∞) = 0.
The eﬃciency of eﬀort technology is (sub)market-specific, while the cost of search depends on
the overall search eﬀort. This distinction between market-specific and overall search eﬀort is not
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useful in the localized search model, where workers must choose one and only one market before
searching a job. However, the fact that the eﬃciency of eﬀort features decreasing marginal
returns on each market will be crucial in the ubiquitous search model of section 3. Beyond
such technical importance, we believe that Assumption A1 captures the main aspects of the job
search process. Searching jobs like searching ideas has two components: tiredness and eﬃciency.
Tiredness depends on overall investment. This is why the marginal search cost depends on
the aggregate search investment. Eﬃciency depends on the amount of resources spent on the
particular market that is prospected. So far, the marginal productivity of search investment
in terms of increased probability to match only depends on market-specific investment. Such
marginal productivity is decreasing, which reflects the fact that courting jobs more aggressively
involves tasks of increasing diﬃculties. For instance, it is easy to put a stamp on the letter of
one’s application. It is more diﬃcult to adapt the letter to the characteristics of the job and of
one’s CV.3
A sub-market may be either closed — when no one enters this sub-market — or opened. Which
sub-markets are closed and which sub-markets are opened is an outcome of the model. When
there are u(w) unemployed persons searching on the sub-market oﬀering the wage w, and when
the search eﬀort of an individual on this sub-market reaches s(w), the overall eﬃcient search
eﬀort on this sub-market amounts to x(w)u(w) where x(w) ≡ x [s(w)] is the market-specific
mean eﬃcient search intensity. With v(w) vacancies oﬀering the wage w, the flow number of
matches on island w is equal to M [x(w)u(w), v(w)], where the matching function satisfies the
following standard assumption:
Assumption A2 The technology M : [0,+∞) × [0,+∞) → [0,+∞) is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing in each of its arguments, strictly concave and linearly homoge-
nous. It satisfies the boundary conditions M (U, 0) = M (0, V ) = 0, and lim
U→+∞
M(U, V ) =
lim
V→+∞
M(U, V ) = +∞.
Let m (θ) ≡M (1/θ, 1). The flow probability for a vacant job oﬀering the wage w to meet a
job-seeker is:
m [θ (w)] ≡ M [x(w)u(w), v(w)]
v(w)
,
while the flow probability for a job seeker to meet a vacant job per eﬃcient unit of search is:
θ (w)m [θ (w)] ≡ M [x(w)u(w), v(w)]
x(w)u(w)
.
In these formulas, θ (w) ≡ v (w) /x (w)u(w) is the market-specific tightness, that is the
tightness specific to island w.
3There is an analogy with the way we write our papers. Most of us write several papers at a time, and we know
that they have heterogenous qualities. Why don’t we only work on the best one? The reason is the following.
The returns on the first hours spent on each paper is huge: your first draft was not so bad after all! Then, the
hourly return of your search activity on a particular paper falls down (step 3 of your so intuitive result is finally
proved). You may find it worthwhile to write several papers of diﬀerent qualities because you can compensate a
lower expected reward by a higher marginal productivity of your search investment. Finally, you will spend more
time on the best paper, but you will also work on your other projects.
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2.2 Agents’ behavior
We study the steady state of a continuous time economy. There are a continuum of identical
and infinitely-lived firms and workers. Each firm is associated with only one job. The measure
of workers is normalized to one, while the measure of firms is endogenously determined through
entry. Both are risk neutral and discount time at instantaneous rate r. Jobs can be either
filled or vacant, while workers can be either employed or unemployed. A pair of worker/firm
produces a flow output y until (exogenous) separation at rate q. Unemployed workers enjoy
unemployment income z, 0 ≤ z < y, while firms endowed with a vacancy bear the flow cost h.
Following Moen (1997) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999, 2000), we assume that workers
observe all posted wage w and corresponding market tightness θ(w).Workers decide which sub-
market to enter on the basis of this knowledge. Let Vu(w) and Ve (w) denote respectively, the
value of unemployment and the value of employment on the sub-market oﬀering the wage w.
The asset value equations for Ve (w) and Vu(w) are given by:
rVe(w) = w + q [Vu(w)− Ve(w)] (1)
rVu(w) = max
s
{z − c(s) + x (s) θ (w)m [θ (w)] [Ve(w)− Vu(w)]} (2)
Let us denote by R (w) ≡ rVu (w) the flow gain of an unemployed. The optimal search
investment s (w) responds to:
c0 [s(w)] = x0 [s(w)] θ (w)m [θ (w)]
w −R (w)
r + q
(3)
R(w) = z − c [s (w)] + x [s (w)] θ (w)m [θ (w)] w −R (w)
r + q
(4)
The asset values of a vacancy advertised at wage w, denoted Πv(w), and of a filled job paying
w, denoted Πe(w), satisfy the arbitrage equations:
rΠv(w) = −h+m [θ (w)] [Πe(w)−Πv(w)] , rΠe(w) = y − w + q [Πv(w)−Πe(w)] (5)
Consequently, when an entrepreneur decides to post the wage w, her expected gain is given
by:
rΠv(w) =
−h(r + q) +m [θ (w)] (y − w)
r + q +m [θ (w)]
(6)
The main consequence of the assumption of localized search, according to which an unem-
ployed is constrained to search for a job on one and only one sub-market, is that competition
between employers to attract workers oblige firms to oﬀer the same expected utility for the
unemployed on each opened sub-market. Let us denote by Vu this common value, and by
R = rVu = max
w
R (w) the associated reservation wage. This has two implications.
First, the search eﬀort is the same on all opened sub-markets. Formally, let Ω ∈ [R, y] be
the set of potentially opened sub-markets. For all w ∈ Ω, equations (3) and (4) imply that
R = z − c [s(w)] + c0 [s(w)] x [s(w)]
x0 [s(w)]
(7)
Assumption A1 implies that, for a given R ≥ z, there exists a unique search eﬀort s(w)
which is solution of equation (7). This optimal search eﬀort does not depend on w, and we will
denote it by σ(R). It is easy to check that σ0(R) > 0.
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Second, the wage on any opened sub-market maximizes the utility of the unemployed. This
implies that there is a monotonous relationship between the tightness on opened sub-markets
and the workers’ common reservation wage. Formally, for all w ∈ Ω, equations (3) and (7) give:
c0 [σ(R)] = x0 [σ(R)] θ (w)m [θ (w)]
w −R
r + q
(8)
This equality implicitly defines tightness as a function θ(w,R) of the workers’ reservation
wage. It is easy to check that θR (w,R) > 0.
2.3 Localized search equilibrium
For each sub-market, firms must make expectations concerning the associated market tightness.
Given that only a subset of potential sub-markets will be opened in equilibrium, such expec-
tations concern both equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium outcomes. We shall denote by eθ (w)
firms’ common expectation on the pattern by wage of market tightness. In the sequel, we will
restrain ourselves to the following hypothesis.
Assumption A3 Let R ≥ 0 be given. Firms’ expectations are given by
eθ (w) = ½ θ (w,R) if w ∈ [R, y]
0 elsewhere
.
The idea is the following. Firms have no reason to post a wage on a sub-market that will
not be prospected by the job-seekers. Yet, they must assign a value to the tightness variable
when evaluating the opportunity to post a wage on a particular sub-market. They rationally
expect that if this sub-market were opened, it would be consistent with workers’ maximization
process. Consequently, when an entrepreneur chooses to post a wage equal to w, she considers,
for a given reservation wage R, that the corresponding eﬀort σ(R) and market tightness θ(w)
must satisfy the system of equations (7) and (8).
On the basis of this expectation eθ(w), each entrepreneur maximizes her expected gain Πv(w)
given by (6). Diﬀerentiating Πv(w) with respect to w and setting this derivative to zero yields:n
m0
heθ (w)ieθ0 (w) (y −w)−m heθ (w)ionr + q +m heθ (w)io
+m0
heθ (w)ieθ0 (w)n−h(r + q) +m heθ (w)i (y − w)o = 0
The free-entry condition, Πv(w) = 0, implies that the last term between brackets vanishes
and the optimal market wage is characterized by the following equation:
α
³eθ (w)´ eθ0 (w)eθ (w) = − 1y − w (9)
where α (θ) = −θm0 (θ) /m (θ) ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of the recruitment rate with respect
to market tightness.
On the other hand, diﬀerentiating relation (8) with respect to w, one gets:
eθ0 (w)eθ (w) = θw (w,R)θ (w,R) = − 1[1− α (θ (w,R))] (w −R)
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Substituting this expression of eθ0 (w) /eθ (w) into (9) gives the optimal market wage as a function
of reservation wage R and market tightness eθ(w):
w = α
³eθ (w)´ y + h1− α³eθ (w)´iR (10)
In equilibrium, equation (6) implies that the market tightness θ (w) must satisfy:
m [θ (w)] =
h(r + q)
y − w (11)
The consistency of expectations implies that eθ (w) = θ (w) in equilibrium. This yields
w = α (θ (w)) y + [1− α (θ (w))]R (12)
The following Lemma shows that this equation defines a unique wage for a given R. This
wage is the wage that would be determined in a Nash bargain with the worker bargaining power
parameter equal to the Hosios value, that is the elasticity of the matching technology with
respect to unemployment.
Lemma 1 Let φ : [0, y]×R→ R be such that
φ(w,R) ≡ α (θ (w)) y + [1− α (θ (w))]R− w with θ (w) = m−1
∙
h(r + q)
y −w
¸
,
For all R ∈ [0, y], φ (w,R) = 0 has a unique root in w.
The properties of the localized search equilibrium are summarized in the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 1 The localized search equilibrium
Under Assumptions A1, A2 and A3,
(i) A localized search equilibrium is characterized by a quadruplet (θ∗, s∗, w∗, R∗) correspond-
ing to the equilibrium value of the labor market tightness, the search eﬀort, the wage and the
flow gain of an unemployed that satisfies:
m (θ) =
h(r + q)
y −w (13)
c0 (s) = x0 (s) θm (θ)
w −R
r + q
(14)
R = z − c (s) + x (s) θm (θ) w −R
r + q
(15)
w = α (θ) y + [1− α (θ)]R (16)
(ii) There exists a unique localized search equilibrium.
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Using equations (13) to (16), it is possible to show that s∗ and θ∗ are the solutions of the
following system:
h
m (θ∗)
=
[1− α (θ∗)] [y − z + c (s∗)]
r + q + x(s∗)α (θ∗) θ∗m (θ∗)
, c0 (s∗) =
α (θ∗)
1− α (θ∗)hθ
∗x0 (s∗) (17)
These equations will prove useful while studying the eﬃciency properties of the localized
search equilibrium (see Proposition 7 in Section 5).
To end characterizing the localized search equilibrium, it remains to define the unemployment
rate. As the equilibrium wage is unique, there is a unique opened (sub-)market. On this market,
the job finding rate, denoted by λ∗, is given by:
λ∗ = x [σ(R∗)] θ∗m(θ∗),
and the stationary equilibrium unemployment rate, denoted by u∗, stems from the equality
between the flows in and out of employment, i.e. q(1− u∗) = λ∗u∗. Finally, one has:
u∗ =
q
q + λ∗
For our purpose, the main result is that there is a unique equilibrium wage when job search
is localized. We now consider the labor market equilibrium when we relax the assumption of
localized search.
3 Ubiquitous search
3.1 Agents’ behavior with ubiquity
As in the previous section, the search market is segmented by wage. The behavior of the en-
trepreneurs remains unchanged, i.e. firms post vacancies with associated non-negotiable wages.
However, we now assume that an unemployed person is able to search simultaneously on every
existing sub-market. Hence, there is ubiquity on the search market: a job-seeker is not bound
to search on a single sub-market. Ubiquity means that the worker has to decide on the search
investment on every existing sub-market.
If there are u unemployed persons in the economy, the overall search eﬀort on the sub-
market oﬀering the wage w now amounts to x(w)u where x(w) still denotes the market-specific
mean eﬃciency of search eﬀorts. With v(w) vacancies oﬀering the wage w, the flow number of
matches on sub-market w is equal toM [x(w)u, v(w)], where the matching function still satisfies
Assumption A2. Consequently, the flow probability for a vacant job to meet a job-seeker and
the flow probability for a job-seeker to meet a vacant job per eﬃcient unit of search on the
sub-market oﬀering the wage w are given by:
m [θ (w)] ≡ M [x(w)u, v(w)]
v(w)
, θ (w)m [θ (w)] ≡ M [x(w)u, v(w)]
x(w)u
,
where market-specific tightness is now defined by θ (w) ≡ v (w) /x (w)u.
Let us denote by Vu the expected lifetime utility of an unemployed individual. If this person
takes a job paying w, she obtains the lifetime utility Ve(w) described by the arbitrage equation:
rVe(w) = w + q [Vu − Ve(w)]
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It follows that the reservation wage, R, is always such that R = rVu. A priori, the set of
possible wages — equivalently, the set of islands — covers the entire interval [z, y], but the set
of islands that will be visited belongs to the interval [R, y]. Like in the previous section, each
job-seeker observes the posted wage w and the corresponding labor market tightness θ (w) on
each sub-market.
But now, an unemployed person has to choose the set {s(w)} of search eﬀorts that she will
simultaneously exert on each sub-market w. Let us denote by S =
R y
R s (w) dw the total search
eﬀort, the expected gain of a job seeker reads:
rVu = max
s(.)
½
z − c (S) +
Z y
R
x [s (w)] θ (w)m [θ (w)] [Ve(w)− Vu] dw
¾
(18)
It must be stressed that unlike other models with multiple applications (see for instance GK,
or Albrecht et al., 2006), workers can only receive one oﬀer at a time in our framework. This
property is very convenient, because it makes the working of our model very similar to the stan-
dard job search model. In particular, workers follow a reservation wage strategy while deciding
which market to prospect. The reason why there are no multiple oﬀers can be understood as
follows. Suppose that the search space is actually composed of a discrete number of matching
places, each of size dw. Hence, there are (y −R) /dw sub-markets. The probability to receive an
oﬀer from the subset [w,w + dw] during the interval of time dt is x [s (w)] θ (w)m [θ (w)] dwdt.
This probability decreases with the number of matching places. As dw tends to 0, the number
of matching places tends to infinity, and the probability to receive an oﬀer on a particular sub-
market tends to 0. As a result, the probability to receive more than one oﬀer at a time tends to
0 as the interval of time dt also tends to 0. We give a complete proof of the result at the end of
the Appendix.
On sub-market w, the optimal search eﬀort of an unemployed person is characterized by the
first-order condition:
c0(S) = x0 [s(w)] θ (w)m (θ (w))
w −R
r + q
, for all w ∈ [R, y] (19)
And the equation (18) defining Vu becomes:
R = z − c(S) +
Z y
R
x [s (w)] θ (w)m (θ (w))
w −R
r + q
dw (20)
The first-order condition (19) states that, in every sub-market, the marginal cost of searching
for a job must be equal to the marginal gain of this activity. This relation highlights the fact that
the search technology x(s) must exhibit marginal decreasing returns to obtain a definite search
eﬀort associated with each sub-market. Indeed, under constant marginal returns to search, a
job-seeker would allocate her whole search investment to the sub-market that yields the largest
reward. Such a sub-market oﬀers the best combination of wage and employment probability, i.e.
it gives the greatest expected utility gain represented by the product θ (w)m (θ (w)) (w −R).
Hence, despite workers would be allowed to search on several sub-markets at a time, they would
not use this possibility and only one market would be opened. This result does not hold anymore
with marginal decreasing returns in the search technology. A worker can then compensate a
lower reward by investing less, which raises the marginal productivity of search eﬀort and leaves
the marginal benefit to search unchanged.
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Consequently, there is no longer a unique value of the search eﬀort: the search investment
varies on each prospected sub-market. Moreover, equations (19) and (20) imply that the reser-
vation wage R and the collection of search eﬀorts {s (w)} are linked by
R = z − c(S) + c0(S)
Z y
R
x [s (w)]
x0 [s (w)]
dw (21)
S =
Z y
R
s (w) dw (22)
Tightness on each sub-market must satisfy equation (19). This equation defines tightness as a
function θ (w,R, {s (w)}) in which the reservation wage R and the set of search eﬀorts {s (w)}
are linked by (21) and (22).
3.2 Ubiquitous search equilibrium
As in the localized search case, for each sub-market, firms must make expectations concerning
the associated tightness. We shall still denote by eθ (w) firms’ common expectation on the pattern
by wage of market tightness. We consider the following assumption.
Assumption A3’ Let R ≥ z and {s (w)}w≥R such that (21) and (22) hold. Firms’ expectations
are given by eθ (w) = ½ θ (w,R, {s (w)}) if w ∈ [R, y]
0 elsewhere
.
Assumption A3’ is a mere adaptation of Assumption A3 in the context of ubiquitous search.
First, firms have no reason to post a wage on a sub-market that will not be prospected by the
job-seekers. Second, they must assign a value to the tightness variable when evaluating the
opportunity to post a wage on a particular sub-market. They rationally expect that if this sub-
market were opened, it would be consistent with workers’ maximization process. Consequently,
when an entrepreneur chooses to post a wage equal to w, she considers that, for a given reser-
vation wage R and a given collection {s (w)}w≥R of search eﬀorts satisfying (21) and (22), the
market tigthness must satisfy the equation (19).
The asset values Πv(w) and Πe(w) of a vacancy posting a wage w and of a filled job paying
this wage are still defined by the relations (5). On the basis of her expectation eθ (w) defined
in Assumption A3’, each entrepreneur can maximize her expected gain Πv(w) given by (6).
Formally, the entrepreneur’s problem is the same as in the case with localized search. Thus, when
the free-entry condition Πv(w) = 0 is satisfied, the equilibrium value of the market tightness
function θ (w) is still given by equation (11) for any wage in the interval [R, y]. It is worth to
notice that the latter equation signifies that a firm advertising a high wage vacancy expects this
vacancy to be filled quickly — m (θ (w)) has to be large — while a firm advertising a low wage
vacancy can wait longer. This is the reason why the equilibrium value of the tightness function
must be decreasing with the wage.
Proposition 2 The ubiquitous search equilibrium
Under Assumptions A1, A2 and A3’,
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(i) An ubiquitous search equilibrium is characterized by a quadruplet (θ∗(w), s∗(w), S∗, R∗)
corresponding to the equilibrium value of the labor market tightness function, the search eﬀort
function, the global eﬀort and the flow gain of an unemployed, that satisfies:
m [θ(w)] =
h(r + q)
y − w , ∀w ∈ [R, y] (23)
c0(S) = x0 [s(w)] θ (w)m [θ (w)]
w −R
r + q
,∀w ∈ [R, y] (24)
R = z − c(S) +
Z y
R
x [s (w)] θ (w)m (θ (w))
w −R
r + q
dw (25)
S =
Z y
R
s (w) dw (26)
(ii) There exists a unique ubiquitous search equilibrium.
The ubiquitous search equilibrium displays two main features. First, it is unique. Second,
all wages belonging to the interval [R, y] are prospected, so that [R, y] is also the support of
the equilibrium wage distribution. These two features are deeply related to each other: they
crucially depend on the ubiquity assumption — the fact that there are no restrictions on the
size of prospected markets. Indeed, workers follow a reservation wage strategy. Hence, they
prospect all the markets that oﬀer a wage larger than the reservation wage R. Without loss of
generality, suppose for instance there is an interval [a, b] ⊂ [R, y] such that wages belonging to
[a, b] are not oﬀered in equilibrium. Consider the wage wˆ such that a < wˆ ≤ b. An employer
oﬀering the wage b obtains (y − b) / (r + q) if the job is filled, or obtains 0 if it is vacant. This
employer may decide to oﬀer the wage bw. In such case, he would be the only employer on
the corresponding sub-market, and, therefore, the probability to match would be one in any
time interval. His profit would be (y − bw) / (r + q) > (y − a) / (r + q). Of course, such profit
opportunity would be exploited, and employers would enter this new market until the free entry
condition is satisfied. Put otherwise, there are no holes in the equilibrium set of oﬀered wages.
Of course, the key reason relies on the fact that workers cannot be captured on a particular
subset of the search space.
To end characterizing the ubiquitous search equilibrium, it remains to define the unemploy-
ment rate. The job-finding rate is worth
λ =
Z y
R
x [s (w)] θ (w)m [θ(w)] dw,
that is the sum of the diﬀerent rates of contact over the diﬀerent markets the job-seekers
prospect. Unemployment can then be computed from the equality between flows in and out of
unemployment: q(1− u) = λu. The unemployment rate is worth u = q/ (q + λ).
We now turn to the properties of the equilibrium.
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3.3 Market-specific search investment
Diﬀerentiating the logarithm of both sides of equation (24) with respect to w, we get:
−x
00 [s(w)]
x0 [s(w)]
s0(w) =
θ0(w)
θ(w)
[1− α (θ (w))] + 1
w −R (27)
while diﬀerentiating (23) with respect to w still gives (9). Then, eliminating θ0(w)/θ(w)
between (27) and (9) one obtains:
s0 (w) ≡ − x
0 [s(w)]
x00 [s(w)]
α (θ (w)) y + [1− α (θ (w))]R− w
α (θ (w)) (y −w)(w −R) (28)
Equation (27) shows that the wage has two conflicting eﬀects on search eﬀort. On the one
hand, there is a positive direct eﬀect. At given market tightness, a higher wage raises the return
to search, thereby motivating search investment (this eﬀect is captured by the positive term
1/ (w −R)). On the other hand, there is a negative indirect eﬀect. Indeed, market tightness de-
creases with the wage. A higher wage deteriorates the search prospects, thereby reducing search
investment (this eﬀect is captured by the negative term [1− α (θ (w))] θ0(w)/θ (w)). Therefore
the sign of s0 (w) seems ambiguous. We can go further by noticing that the function φ(w,R)
defined in Lemma 1 appears at the right-hand side of equation (28). More precisely, one can
see that s0 (w) has the same sign as φ(w,R). This remark enables us to state the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 The pattern of search investment
Under Assumptions A1 to A3, the eﬀort function s : [R, y] → [0,+∞) is ∩-shaped and
satisfies s (R) = s (y) = 0
The key finding of Proposition 3 is the non-monotonicity of the relationship between wage
and search investment depicted by Figure 1. The pattern of search investment reflects the
pattern of marginal reward to search. Remind such reward consists in a peculiar combination
of wage and employment probability given by the expected utility gain θ (w)m [θ (w)] (w −R) .
Search investment is thus very small at both low and high wages. In the former case, employment
probability represented by θ (w)m [θ (w)] is large, but it is not worth to invest a lot as the wage
w is close to the reservation wage R. In the latter case, the wage may be very good, but job
opportunities collapse. More generally, the direct positive eﬀect of the wage on search investment
dominates at low wages, while the indirect negative eﬀect due to lower tightness dominates at
higher wages. The search investment then reaches a maximum on the market where the reward
is the highest.
Let us denote by w1(R) the root of equation φ (w,R) = 0 that gives the largest search invest-
ment (see Figure 1). This wage is defined by w1(R) = α [θ (w1(R))] y + {1− α [θ (w1(R))]}R.
For R given, this wage is the only wage oﬀer in the localized search equilibrium (see equation
(12)).
4 Wage distributions with ubiquity
The purpose of this section is to analyse the shape of the wage distribution that is implied by our
model. We proceed in three steps. First, we focus on the equilibrium wage oﬀer distribution.
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Figure 1: Search investment by wage
Second, we analyse the wage distribution among employed workers. Third, we consider an
example.
4.1 The wage oﬀer distribution
The number of vacancies advertised at wage w is worth v(w) = θ (w)x [s (w)]u, where u repre-
sents the unemployment rate. The total number of vacancies is thus v =
R y
R v (w) dw. The cdf
and the pdf of the wage oﬀer distribution are then defined by
F (w) =
R w
R v (ξ) dξ
v
, F 0 (w) =
v(w)
v
= θ (w)x [s (w)]
u
v
(29)
How does the density change with the wage? Taking the second derivative of F yields
F 00 (w)
F 0 (w)
≡ θ
0 (w)
θ (w)
+
x0 [s (w)] s0(w)
x [s (w)]
(30)
Changes in the density of the wage oﬀer distribution reflect changes in the number of vacan-
cies associated with each wage (i.e. v0(w)/v (w) = F 00 (w) /F 0 (w)). Equation (30) shows that
such changes result from two main factors: the pattern of market tightness by wage on the one
hand, and the pattern of search investment by wage on the other hand. Hence, the right-hand
side of equation (30) is composed of two terms. The first term is negative and reflects the fact
that tightness is strictly decreasing in wage. Due to this term, the density of the wage oﬀer
distribution tends to decrease with the wage as the number of job oﬀers per unit of search
declines when the wage raises. The second term depicts the influence of search investments.
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It is non-monotonous, reflecting the non-monotonicity of s (w). More precisely, it is positive
at wages close to the lower bound of the support [R, y] of the wage oﬀer distribution, while it
becomes negative at wages close to the upper bound.
With the help of (9) and (28), we have:
F 00 (w)
F 0 (w)
=
γ(w) {α (θ (w)) y + [1− α (θ (w))]R− w}− (w −R)
α (θ (w)) (y −w)(w −R) (31)
with γ(w) = − x
02[s(w)]
x[s(w)]x00[s(w)] > 0. It appears that F
00(w) has the same sign as the function
ψ(w,R) ≡ γ(w)φ(w,R) − (w − R). Hence, the properties of the wage oﬀer distribution will
depend on the number of roots of the equation ψ(w,R) = 0. The following assumption will be
useful to obtain more precise results.
Assumption A4 Let ψ : [0, y]×R→ R be such that
ψ(w,R) = γ(w)φ(w,R)− (w −R)
For all R ∈ [0, y], ψ(w,R) = 0 has a unique root in w.
One can check that this assumption is satisfied with a Cobb-Douglas matching function (α
is then a constant) and with an isoelastic eﬃciency search function (γ is then a constant).
Proposition 4 Properties of the wage offer distribution
Under Assumptions A1 to A3,
(i) Non-monotonicity. The wage oﬀer distribution F : [R, y]→ [0, 1] is non-monotonous and
satisfies F 0 (R) = F 0 (y) = 0.
(ii) Single peak. If in addition A4 holds, the wage oﬀer distribution is ∩-shaped
(iii) Right tail. If lim
θ→0
α (θ) > 0 and lim
w→y
γ (w) <∞, F 00 (y) = 0
We obtain three results. First, the density of the wage oﬀer distribution is non-monotonous.
This is in sharp contrast with the literature discussed in the introduction, which predicts either
increasing or decreasing density of the wage oﬀer distribution. Actually, the result is induced
by the non-monotonicity of the pattern of search investment by wage level. If search investment
could not vary with the wage, the density of the wage oﬀer distribution would be strictly de-
creasing, only reflecting the decreasing pattern of tightness with respect to the wage. Note that
ψ(w1(R), R) < 0: the peak of the wage oﬀer distribution corresponds to a lower wage than the
peak of the search investment function. This reflects the fact that tightness is strictly decreasing
in wage. Second, the density is single-peaked provided some additional (yet not too demanding)
restrictions on the matching technology and the eﬃciency of eﬀort function hold. Third, the
wage oﬀer distribution generally has a flat tail at its upper bound.
4.2 The actual wage distribution
As search intensity varies with the wage level, the actual wage distribution (i.e. the distribu-
tion of wages among the employees, which coincides with the wage distribution among newly
employed workers) departs from the wage oﬀer distribution. Let G(w) be the cdf of the actual
wage distribution among the employees. It can be deduced from a standard flow equilibrium
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reasoning. For each wage w ∈ [R, y], the outflow from the pool of those employed who earn less
than w equals the inflow from the pool of unemployed:
q(1− u)G(w) = u
Z w
R
x [s(ξ] θ(ξ)m [θ(ξ)] dξ
Since q(1− u) = λu, and remembering that v (w) = vF 0 (w) = x [s (w)] θ(w)u, it comes:
G(w) =
v
λu
Z w
R
F 0(ξ)m [θ(ξ)] dξ
Thus, one has:
G0(w) =
v
λu
F 0(w)m [θ(w)] (32)
Diﬀerentiating this latter equality with respect to w and taking into account (9) gives:
G00 (w)
G0 (w)
=
F 00 (w)
F 0 (w)
− α (θ (w)) θ
0 (w)
θ (w)
=
F 00 (w)
F 0 (w)
+
1
y − w (33)
Using relations (31) that defines F 00(w), one arrives at:
G00 (w)
G0 (w)
=
ψ(w,R) + α (θ (w)) (w −R)
α (θ (w)) (y − w)(w −R) (34)
It appears thatG00(w) has the same sign as the function χ(w,R) ≡ ψ(w,R)+α (θ (w)) (w−R).
Hence, the properties of the actual wage distribution depend on the number of roots of the
equation χ(w,R) = 0. The following assumption will be useful to obtain more precise results.
Assumption A5 Let ψ : [0, y]×R→ R be such that
χ(w,R) = ψ(w,R) + α (θ (w)) (w −R)
For all R ∈ [0, y], χ(w,R) = 0 has a unique root in w.
One can check that this assumption is satisfied with a Cobb-Douglas matching function (α
is then a constant) and with a isoelastic eﬃciency search function (γ is then a constant).
Proposition 5 Properties of the actual wage distribution
Under Assumptions A1 to A3,
(i) Non-monotonicity. The actual wage distribution G : [R, y] → [0, 1] is non-monotonous
and satisfies G0 (R) = G0 (y) = 0.
(ii) Stochastic dominance. G (w) < F (w) for all w ∈ (R, y)
(iii) Single-peak. If in addition A5 holds, the actual wage distribution is ∩-shaped
Like the wage oﬀer distribution, the actual wage distribution features properties that are
remarkably consistent with the facts: non-monotonous and generally single-peaked. However,
unlike the wage oﬀer distribution, the actual wage distribution is not always right-tailed. Note
that the wage oﬀer distribution first-order stochastically dominates the actual wage distribution.
It means that individuals confronted with both distributions would unambiguously choose the
latter. Such result is not very surprising: the job-seekers observe the wage oﬀer distribution, and
alter the wage they will be paid later by modulating their search investment on each sub-market.
This optimization process makes the actual wage distribution looks better than the wage oﬀer
distribution.
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4.3 A Cobb-Douglas example
We end up this section by considering usual explicit forms for the matching function and the
eﬃciency of eﬀort function. In the sequel, we will refer to this particular case as the Cobb-
Douglas example. It appears that with such specifications, the wage oﬀer distribution and the
actual wage distribution are strongly linked with a well-known statistical distribution, the Beta
distribution.
Proposition 6 The Cobb-Douglas example
Assume that m(θ) = M0θ−α, M0 > 0, α ∈ (0, 1) and x(s) = s
γ
1+γ , γ > 0. Let ω =
(w −R) / (y −R) be the normalized wage, and let also HF be the cdf of the normalized wage
oﬀer distribution, while HG is the cdf of the actual normalized wage distribution. Then,
(i) H 0F is the density of a β
¡
1−α
α γ +
1
α + 1, γ + 1
¢
distribution, that is
H 0F (ω) =
(1− ω)
1−α
α γ+
1
α ωγ
B
¡
1−α
α γ +
1
α + 1, γ + 1
¢ , ∀ω ∈ [0, 1]
(ii) H 0G is the density of a β
¡
1−α
α (γ + 1) + 1, γ + 1
¢
distribution, that is
H 0G (ω) =
(1− ω)
1−α
α (γ+1) ωγ
B
¡
1−α
α (γ + 1) + 1, γ + 1
¢ , ∀ω ∈ [0, 1]
where B is the Beta function such that
B (t1 + 1, t2 + 1) =
Z 1
0
(1− ξ)t1 ξt2dξ
The Cobb-Douglas example displays several appealing features. First, we can find a normal-
ization of the wage such that the oﬀer distribution and the actual distribution of such normalized
wage follow simple Beta distributions. Second, the parameters of the Beta distributions only
involve the elasticity of the matching function and the elasticity of eﬀort function. We do not
need to solve the model to find the shape of the diﬀerent wage distributions. Third, the wage
distributions are both single-peaked. Fourth, the wage oﬀer distribution has a flat right tail.
Moreover,
F 00 (R) = γ
(y −R) 1−αα γ+ 1αR y
R(y − ξ)
1−α
α γ+
1
α (ξ −R)γdξ
lim
w→R
(w −R)γ−1
Thus F 00 (R) can either be nil or infinite depending on whether γ is larger or lower than one.
Fifth, we can highlight the parameter circumstances under which the actual wage distribution
has a flat right tail. Indeed, G”(y) = 0 if γ > 2α−11−α and G”(y) = −∞ if γ <
2α−1
1−α . Thus,
the actual wage distribution is right-skewed when the parameters of the matching function and
the search function satisfy γ > 2α−11−α . Right-skewness is not a systematic property but can
occur for a wide range of parameters of the model. Similarly, we can show that G00 (R) = 0
if γ > 1 and G00 (R) = ∞ if γ < 1. Therefore, the Cobb-Douglas case is consistent with an
actual wage distribution characterized by a single peak, a flat right tail, and no left tail. It is
so when 2α−11−α < γ < 1. The following figure depicts the pdf of the wage oﬀer and actual wage
distributions in such a case.
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Figure 2: Wage oﬀer and actual wage distributions - case 2α−11−α < γ < 1
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Finally, note the role played by the parameter γ of the eﬃciency of eﬀort function. When
γ tends to 0, the search intensity is the same in each sub-market. The shape of the wage
distribution only reflects the pattern of market tightness by wage. The density of the wage oﬀer
distribution as well as the density of the actual wage distribution are then strictly decreasing in
wage. Conversely, when γ tends to infinity, the eﬃciency of eﬀort function has constant marginal
returns. As a result, workers concentrate their search investment in the sub-market where the
returns are the highest. Both the wage oﬀer distribution and the actual wage distribution
collapse to a single wage, the only wage oﬀer of the localized search equilibrium.
From an empirical perspective, the Beta distribution should be rejected by the data because
it does not feature the Paretian tail typical of empirical wage distributions. Yet, two points
should be made. On the one hand, such Beta distribution is obtained for homogenous firms
and workers. Introducing some heterogeneity on the firm/worker side should make the Cobb-
Douglas example compatible with a Paretian-tailed aggregate wage distribution. On the other
hand, the main objective of the Cobb-Douglas example is to illustrate our main results. Another
parameterization of the eﬀort function can generate wage distributions that fit the empirical wage
distributions better. But, of course, at the cost of losing the simplicity of the Cobb-Douglas
example.
5 Eﬃciency
In this section, we compare the decentralized outcome to the eﬃcient allocation. This comparison
is made under the two cases highlighted so far, i.e. when search is localized and when workers
are ubiquitous. We show that the localized search equilibrium is eﬃcient, while the ubiquitous
search equilibrium is not. We proceed in two steps. First, we compute the eﬃcient allocations
at given number of matching places. Second, we endogenize the number of matching places.
5.1 Eﬃcient allocations at given number of matching places
The main conceptual diﬃculty associated with the eﬃcient allocation relies on the segmentation
of the search place. In the decentralized economy, the search market is segmented by wage:
each wage is associated to an autonomous sub-market. It means that market segmentation
requires wage dispersion. For the planner’s problem, we shall assume that the search place is
segmented: in this sub-section, we suppose as Moen (1997) that the mass-number of matching
places (islands, for short) is given.
Let I be the measure of islands, and i ∈ [0, I] be their index. Under localized search, the
unemployed are bound to search a job on a single matching place. The benevolent planner
chooses the number of unemployed u (i) and the number of vacancies v (i) assigned to island
i. The overall unemployment rate is then given by u =
R I
0 u (i) di. Under ubiquitous search
there are no restrictions on the number of prospected places, and u (i) = u in each island. In
both cases, the planner sets the search eﬀort s (i) of workers seeking a job on island i. As a
consequence, the total cost of search investment is defined by
R I
0 c (s (i))u (i) di when search is
localized and by uc
³R I
0 s (i) di
´
when search is ubiquitous. The tightness specific to island i is
given by θ(i) = v (i) / [x (s(i))u] in case of ubiquitous search and by θ(i) = v (i) / [x (s(i))u(i)]
in case of localized search. In both cases, the job-finding rate specific to island i is equal to
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x(s(i))θ(i)m [θ(i)]. When search is localized, we have:
u˙(i) = q [1− u(i)]− u(i)x(s(i))θ(i)m (θ(i)) di, for all i ∈ [0, I] (35)
While when search is ubiquitous, the dynamic of unemployment is:
u˙ = q (1− u)− u
Z I
0
x(s(i))θ(i)m (θ(i)) di (36)
The instantaneous net social products in case of localized search and in case of ubiquitous
search are respectively given by:
ω = y
µ
1−
Z I
0
u (i) di
¶
+ z
Z I
0
u (i) di− c
µZ I
0
s (i)u(i)di
¶
− h
IZ
0
θ(i)x(s(i))u(i)di
ω = y (1− u) + uz − uc
µZ I
0
s (i) di
¶
− hu
IZ
0
θ(i)x(s(i))di
The planner’s problem is to maximize the discounted social product
Z +∞
0
ωe−rtdt with
respect to the relevant variables s(i), θ(i), u (i) or u, and subject to the relevant law of motion,
that is (36) or (35).
The following result describes the stationary solutions of this maximization program for each
search environment.
Proposition 7 The efficient allocations
Under Assumptions A1 and A2, for any given number I of search places
(i) In the localized search case, there is a unique stationary eﬃcient allocation such that
s (i) = sl and θ (i) = θl for all i ∈ [0, I], with
h
m
¡
θl
¢ = £1− α ¡θl¢¤ £y − z + c ¡sl¢¤
r + q + x(sl)α
¡
θl
¢
θlm
¡
θl
¢ (37)
c0
³
sl
´
=
α
¡
θl
¢
1− α
¡
θl
¢hθlx0 ³sl´ (38)
(ii) In the ubiquitous search case, there is a unique stationary eﬃcient allocation such that
s (i) = su and θ (i) = θu, for all i ∈ [0, I], with
h
m (θu)
=
[1− α (θu)] [y − z + c (Isu)]
r + q + x(su)α (θu) θum (θu) I
(39)
c0 (Isu) =
α (θu)
1− α (θu)hθ
ux0(su) (40)
Comparing (37) and (38) with their decentralized counterpart (17) shows that the localized
search equilibrium is eﬃcient. This result is very similar to Moen (1997). Wage-posting can
thus decentralize the eﬃcient allocation.
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When search is ubiquitous, part (ii) of the proposition shows that the planner sets the same
tightness and the same search intensity for all individuals in each island of the interval [0, I].
Tightness and search intensity are decreasing in the measure I of islands. It follows that the
ubiquitous search equilibrium is ineﬃcient. Consider for instance the case where I = y−R, with
R the equilibrium reservation wage. In this case, the number of opened matching places is the
same in the social optimum and in the decentralized economy. However, the search investment
varies from a sub-market to another in the decentralized economy, while it is constant in each
island at the social optimum.
The reason for ineﬃciency is very close to GK. When workers make multiple job applications
(or search simultaneously on several sub-markets), the expected number of matches is maximized
by allocating applications uniformly across jobs (by spreading search eﬀort uniformly across
sub-markets). Julien, Kennes and King (2006) also give a simple argument along these lines.
However, the decentralized allocation features wage dispersion. It follows that search investment
varies across jobs, violating eﬃciency.
5.2 On the number of matching places
In this sub-section, we discuss the optimal number of matching places that would be chosen by
the social planner.
Let us begin with the localized search case. Proposition 7 shows that at given number of
matching places, all allocations featuring a search intensity sl and a tightness θl are eﬃcient.
Owing to constant returns to scale in the matching technology and due to the fact that each
worker must be assigned to a single search place, the stationary social product does not depend
on the number of matching places. As a result, the eﬃcient number of matching places is
indeterminate under localized search. If there were a fixed cost associated with each search
place, the planner would only create a single matching place.
Now, we turn to the ubiquitous search environment. To simplify, consider the case where
the discount rate r tends to 0. Then, the eﬃcient allocation maximizes the stationary social
product. The optimal number of market places results from:
max
I≥0
{ω (I) = (1− u (I)) y + u (I) [z − c (Isu (I))]− hu (I) Iθu (I)xu (I)} (41)
where θu and su are defined by Proposition 7, and u (I) = q/ [q + θu (I)m (θu (I))x (su (I)) I].
The derivative of the objective with respect to I is:
ω0 (I) = −∂u (I)
∂I
[y − z + c (Isu (I)) + hIθu (I)xu (I)]−u (I) su (I) c0 (Isu (I))−hu (I) θu (I)x (su (I))
(42)
Using equations (39) and (40), we obtain:
ω0 (I) =
α
1− αhu (I) θ
u (I)x (su (I))
£
1− su (I)x0 (su (I)) /x (su (I))
¤
(43)
which has the sign of the term between brackets. This term is positive for all I, given that
su tends to 0 as I tends to infinity and x is strictly concave. It follows that the optimal
number of matching places is infinite. Indeed, the planner uses the fact that there are decreasing
marginal returns to search investment: he/she opens an infinite number of matching places and
sets an arbitrarily small search intensity in each place. Similarly tightness tends to 0. This
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result illustrates the ineﬃciency of the decentralized economy, in which the mass-number of
sub-markets is finite. However, it also highlights the asymmetry between the centralized and
the decentralized mechanisms. Indeed, the planner can achieve the segmentation of the search
place without any instrument, while market segmentation in the decentralized economy requires
equilibrium wage dispersion.
To obtain a finite mass-number of islands at the social optimum, we can marginally modify
the technological side of the model. The point is that for the planner, it is always worth
decreasing the search intensity, while simultaneously increasing the number of matching places.
Therefore, we need to alter the search technology, and in particular the eﬃciency of eﬀort
function. For instance, suppose that x (s) > 0 if and only if s > s0. Or, alternatively, suppose
that x is strictly convex, and then concave. Then, the optimal number of matching places is
finite, and the search intensity is positive in each matching place. The latter simply responds
to the following condition familiar to specialists of the eﬃciency wage literature:
su (I)x0 (su (I)) /x (su (I)) = 1 (44)
Similarly, one can modify the search cost function so that it directly depends on the number of
prospected places. This assumption would indeed limit the optimal number of matching places.
Of course, the decentralized economy would also be aﬀected by such assumptions. The main
diﬀerence would be that both the lower bound and the upper bound of the wage distributions
would become endogenous. Indeed, sub-markets oﬀering wages such that V e (w) is close to V u
(i.e. w close to R), or such that θ (w) is close to 0 (i.e. w close to y) would not be opened in
equilibrium. However, the density of the wage oﬀer distribution, as well as the density of the
actual wage distribution would still be hump-shaped4.
6 Conclusion
This paper oﬀers a search equilibrium model in which firms post wages, and there are homoge-
nous firms and workers. The main originality of the model relies on the working of the search
market. We assume that the search market is segmented by wage, and workers choose the amount
of search eﬀort they spend on each (sub-)market. Workers are thus ubiquitous in the sense they
are not bound to choose one and only one market, but can visit the whole set of markets opened
in equilibrium. The main result is that a non-degenerate equilibrium wage distribution exists
and can replicate two major properties of empirical wage distributions, e.g. the distribution can
be single-peaked and right-skewed. All the results are illustrated by a Cobb-Douglas example,
in which the wage distribution is a Beta distribution.
A key feature of our model relies on its simplicity. Its main goal is to show that a rather
natural extension of the usual directed search assumptions (precisely the consideration of ubiq-
uity in market participation) leads to an equilibrium distribution of wages displaying empirically
convincing properties. But, as it stands, our model cannot directly pretend to fit actual wage
distributions. Understanding the quantitative role played by ubiquitous search requires to ex-
tend the model in a number of directions. The next step is to introduce heterogeneity. This
can be done by abandoning the assumption according to which the productivity of a worker is
constant once matched to a firm. One could rather assume that there exists a non-degenerate
distribution of output reflecting firm heterogeneity, worker heterogeneity, or both. Another area
4The model would become more diﬃcult to solve, and thus would lose some of its appealing features.
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of study concerns the profile of wages. A well-documented property of individual wage profile
is that it is increasing with tenure. Such a property does not rise in our model but it occurs in
models with on-the-job search. Thus, another possible step is to add in our model of ubiquitous
search the possibility of searching while employed.
Some policy issues also remain open. Unlike the standard directed search model, the ubiq-
uitous search model ends up with an equilibrium that is not eﬃcient. Hence, other instruments
are needed to achieve eﬃciency.
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APPENDIX
A Proof of Lemma 1
We have φ (R,R) ≥ 0, φ (y,R) ≤ 0. Then, note that according to Assumption A2, the match-
ing function is strictly concave. This implies that [θm (θ)]0 = MV (1, θ) > 0 and [θm (θ)] ” =
MV V (1, θ) < 0. As [θm(θ)]
0 = m(θ) [1− α(θ)], it comes
[θm(θ)]” = m0 (θ) [1− α (θ)]− α0 (θ)m (θ)
= m (θ)
∙
−α (θ)
θ
(1− α (θ))− α0 (θ)
¸
It follows that:
α0 (θ) > −α (θ)
θ
(1− α (θ)) (45)
Now, consider the derivative of function φ with respect to w:
φw (w,R) = α
0 (θ (w)) θ0 (w) (y −R)− 1
with
α (θ (w))
θ0 (w)
θ (w)
= − 1
y − w (46)
Equations (45) and (46) imply that
φw (w,R) <
1− α (θ (w))
y − w (y −R)− 1 =
−φ(w,R)
y −w
This relationship implies that φw (w,R) < 0 whenever φ (w,R) > 0. Consequently, the equation
φ (w,R) = 0 has a unique root in w.
B Proof of Proposition 1
Part (i). The formulas appearing in (i) simply replicate relations (7) (8), (11) and (12).
Part (ii). As a preliminary step, let us examine the property of the function σ : [z, y] → R
given by equation (7). Assumption A1 implies that σ (z) = 0 and σ0 (R) > 0. The solving of the
system (13)-(16) reduces to find (w∗, R∗) such that
c0 [σ(R)] = x0 [σ(R)] θ (w)m (θ (w))
w −R
r + q
(47)
w = α (θ (w)) y + [1− α (θ (w))]R (48)
From Lemma 1, equation (48) implicitly defines a unique w1 = w1 (R). It is strictly increasing
in R, with z < w1 (z) < w1 (y) = y. Now, consider the following function:
J(w,R) = x0 [σ(R)] θ(w)m (θ(w))
w −R
r + q
− c0 [σ(R)]
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An equilibrium solves K (R) = J(w1(R), R) = 0. Assumptions A1 and A2 together with the
properties of the function σ established below imply that
K (z) = θ(w1 (z))m (θ(w1 (z)))
w1 (z)− z
r + q
lim
R→z
x0 (σ (R)) > 0
K (y) = −c0 (σ (y)) < 0
Therefore, it is suﬃcient to show the function K is strictly decreasing. But,
K 0(R) = w01(R)Jw(w1(R), R) + JR(w1(R), R)
Since Jw(w1(R), R) = 0 for all R, we have
K 0(R) = JR(w1(R), R) =
∙
x”θm (θ)
w1 (R)−R
r + q
− c”
¸
σ0(R)− x0θm(θ) 1
r + q
< 0
It follows that R∗ is unique. Then, w∗ = w1 (R∗) and θ∗ = m−1
³
h(r+q)
y−w
´
are uniquely defined.
C Proof of Proposition 2
The formulas appearing in Proposition 2 have been established in the text. It remains to show
that they define a unique equilibrium. To do this, one can remark that thanks to Assumption
A2 equation (23) defines a unique specific market tightness function θ(w). Then, equation (24)
can be solved in s as a function of w, S and R. Let e (w,R, S) be this unique solution. From
Assumption A1 and the implicit function theorem, the partial derivatives of e (w,R, S) are such
that:
eS =
c”(S)
c0(S)
x0(e)
x”(e)
< 0, eR =
1
w −R
x0(e)
x”(e)
< 0
In addition, lim
S→0
e (w,R, S) <∞, while lim
S→∞
e (w,R, S) = 0.
Now, substitute e (w,R, S) for s(w) in equation (25), and consider the function ψ such that
ψ (R,S) = R− z + c(S)−
Z y
R
x [e (w,R, S)] θ (w)m [θ (w)]
w −R
r + q
dw (49)
The properties of the function ψ are as follows:
lim
S→0
ψ (R,S) = R− z −
Z y
R
x [e (w,R, 0)] θ (w)m [θ (w)]
w −R
r + q
dw
lim
S→∞
ψ (R,S) = +∞
ψS (R,S) = c
0(S)
µ
1−
Z y
R
eSdw
¶
> 0
It follows that there exists a unique S1 ≡ S1 (R) such that ψ (R,S1) = 0 iﬀ lim
S→0
ψ (R,S) ≤ 0.
But,
lim
R→z
ψ (R,S) = c (S)−
Z y
z
x [e (w, z, S)] θ (w)m [θ (w)]
w −R
r + q
dw
lim
R→y
ψ (R,S) = y − z > 0 (50)
ψR (R,S) = 1 +
Z y
R
x [s (w)] θ (w)m (θ (w))
r + q
dw − c0(S)
Z y
R
eRdw > 0
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Therefore, there exists a unique eR ∈ (z, y) such that lim
S→0
ψ (R,S) ≤ 0 if and only if R ≤ eR.
To summarize, equation (25) implicitly defines S1 (R) for all R ∈ [z, y], with
S1
³ eR´ = 0 and S01 (R) < R yR eRdw1− R yR eSdw < 0 (51)
Moreover, when e (w,R, S) is substituted for s(w) in equation (26), we obtain another equation
defining a unique S as a function of R. We call this function S2 (R). Diﬀerentiating this latter
equation with respect to R gives:µ
1−
Z y
R
eSdw
¶
dS
dR
= −e(R,R, S) +
Z y
R
eRdw
Assumption A2 and equation (24) imply that e(R,R, S) = 0. Consequently
S02 (R) =
R y
R eRdw
1−
R y
R eSdw
< 0 (52)
So far, we have shown that S01(R) < S02(R) < 0. In addition, S2(y) = 0, which implies that
S2
³ eR´ > S1 ³ eR´ = 0. Lastly, S1(z) and S2(z) are given by:
S2(z) =
Z y
z
e [w, z, S2(z)] dw
c [S1(z)] = c
0 [S1(z)]
Z y
z
x [e (w, z, S1(z))]
x0 [e (w, z, S1(z))]
dw (53)
Assumption A1 implies that x (e) /x0 (e) > e and c(s)/c0(s) < s, therefore (53) gives
S1(z) >
c [S1(z)]
c0 [S1(z)]
>
Z y
z
e [w, z, S1(z)] dw
which proves that S1(z) > S2(z). All these properties of the functions S1(R) and S2(R) entail
that they cross once at a point such that R∗ ∈ (z, y). Thus, the equilibrium values of R and S
are unique. It follows that the equilibrium functions θ∗(w) and s∗(w) given respectively by (23)
and (24) are also unique.
D Proof of Proposition 3
Relation (23) and Assumption A2 imply that θ(y) = 0. Therefore, relation (24) and Assumption
A1 imply that s(y) = 0. Furthermore, (23) shows that θ(R) is finite and (24) and Assumption
A1 then entails that s(R) = 0. Since s is continuous and s (w) > 0 for all w ∈ (R, y), the
function s is not monotonous. Then, s0 (w) is continuous and has the sign of φ (w,R). The
result follows from Lemma 1.
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E Proof of Proposition 4
Part (i). According to proposition 3, one has s (R) = s (y) = 0. Remembering that θ(y) = 0
and that θ(R) is finite, relation (29) arrives at F 0 (R) = F 0 (y) = 0. The result follows from the
facts that F 0 is continuous and F 0 (w) > 0 for all w ∈ (R, y).
Part (ii). Note that F 00 (w) has the sign of ψ(w,R). Hence, each root of the equation
ψ (w,R) = 0 corresponds to a point where F 00 (w) = 0. If Assumption A4 holds, the equation
ψ(w,R) = 0 has a unique root and the wage oﬀer distribution is ∩-shaped.
Part (iii). Equation (31) shows that:
F”(y) = lim
w→y
1
α (θ (w))
F 0(w)
y − w {[α (θ (w))− 1] γ (w)− 1}
Using (29) and (23), one arrives at:
F”(y) =
u
vh(r + q)
lim
w→y
θ (w)m (θ (w))x (s (w))
α (θ (w))
{[α (θ (w))− 1] γ (w)− 1}
The result follows from the facts that θ (w)m (θ (w)) and x [s (w)] are equal to zero when w → y.
F Proof of Proposition 5
Part (i). As G0(w) = vF 0(w)m [θ(w)] /λu, part (i) of Proposition 4 implies that G0 (R) =
G0 (y) = 0. The result follows from the fact that G0 (w) > 0 for all w ∈ (R, y) and the continuity
of G0.
Part (ii). As m [θ(w)] = h(r+q)y−w — see (23) —, relation (32) becomes:
G0(w) =
v
λu
h(r + q)
y − w F
0(w)
Let us denote by w0 the unique wage such that vλu
h(r+q)
y−w0 = 1. A priori, w0 can be greater or
smaller than R. Let us suppose first that w0 ≥ R. One has G0(w) < F 0(w) for w < w0 and
G0(w) > F 0(w) for w > w0. Therefore, when w < w0 one has:
G(w) =
Z w
R
G0(ξ)dξ <
Z w
R
F 0(ξ)dξ = F (w)
While, when w > w0 one has:
1−G(w) =
Z y
w
G0(ξ)dξ >
Z y
w
F 0(ξ)dξ = 1− F (w) (54)
Hence, one always has G(w) < F (w) when w0 ≥ R.
Now, let us assume that w0 < R. Then, one has G0(w) > F 0(w) for all w ≥ R, and (54)
holds for all w ≥ R. Consequently, G(w) < F (w) when w0 < R.
Part (iii). G00 (w) has the sign of χ(w,R). Hence, each root of the equation χ(w,R) = 0
corresponds to a point where F 00 (w) = 0. If Assumption A5 holds, the equation χ(w,R) = 0
has a unique root and the actual wage distribution is ∩-shaped.
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G Proof of Proposition 6
Part (i). In the Cobb-Douglas case, equation (31) becomes:
F”(w)
F 0(w)
=
γ [αy + (1− α)R− w]
α(y − w)(w −R) −
1
α(y − w)
Integrating this equation with the condition
R y
R F
0(w)dw = 1 yields:
F 0(w) =
(y − w) 1−αα γ+ 1α (w −R)γR y
R(y − ξ)
1−α
α γ+
1
α (ξ −R)γdξ
,∀w ∈ [0, y]
The cdf of the normalized wage satisfies
HF (ω) = Pr{w −Ry −R ≤ ω} = Pr{w ≤ R+ ω(y −R)} = F [R+ ω(y −R)]
Therefore, H 0F (ω) = (y −R)F 0 [R+ ω(y −R)], and the result follows.
Part (ii). Using the definitions of the functions φ(w,R) and ψ(w,R), equation (34) becomes:
G00 (w)
G0 (w)
=
γ(y −R)
(y −w)(w −R) −
1 + γ − α
α(y − w)
Integrating this equation with the condition
R y
RG
0(w)dw = 1 yields
G0(w) =
(y − w)
(1+γ)(1−α)
α (w −R)γR y
R(y − ξ)
(1+γ)(1−α)
α (ξ −R)γdξ
(55)
The cdf of the actual normalized wage is such that
HG(ω) = Pr{w −Ry −R ≤ ω} = Pr{w ≤ R+ ω(y −R)} = G [R+ ω(y −R)]
Therefore one gets H 0G(ω) = (y −R)G0 [R+ ω(y −R)], and the result follows.
H Proof of Proposition 7
Part (i). Let ρ (i) denote the costate variable related to (35). The current-valued Hamiltonian
of the problem is:
H = ωe−rt +
IZ
0
ρ(i) {q [1− u(i)]− u(i)x(s(i))θ(i)mθ(i)} di
The first-order conditions are:
∂H
∂s(i)
=
∂H
∂θ(i)
= 0,
∂H
∂u(i)
= −ρ˙(i)
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The condition ∂H/∂s(i) = 0 gives£
c0(s(i)) + hθ(i)x0(s(i))
¤
e−rt + ρ(i)x0(s(i))θ(i)m (θ(i)) = 0, ∀i[0, I] (56)
Similarly, the condition ∂H/∂θ(i) = 0 gives
he−rt = −ρ(i)m (θ(i)) [1− α (θ(i))] , ∀i[0, I] (57)
The Euler equations read as:
[−y + z − c(s(i))− hθ(i)x(s(i))s(i)] e−rt − ρ(i) [q + x(s(i))θ(i)m (θ(i))] = −ρ˙(i) (58)
Diﬀerentiating (57) with respect to time, and taking the result at the stationary state (where
θ˙(i) = 0), entails ρ˙(i) = −rρ(i). Equations (58) and 57) then give
h
m (θ(i))
=
[1− α (θ(i))] [y − z + c (s(i))]
r + q + x(s(i))α (θ(i)) θ(i)m (θ(i))
(59)
Similarly, equations (56) and (57) give
c0 (s(i)) =
α (θ(i))
1− α (θ(i))hθ(i)x
0(s(i)) (60)
Equations (59) and (60) form a system of two equations with two unknowns s(i) and θ(i). These
conditions are similar to the localized search equilibrium given by the system (17). Therefore a
unique solution results and s(i) = sl, while θ(i) = θl, for all i[0, I]. Finally, note that the Euler
conditions are satisfied for all u (i) ≥ 0, so that if I were also a control variable, the number of
opened matching places would be indeterminate.
Part (ii). Let us denote by ρ the costate variable related to (36), the Hamiltonian of the
problem is:
H = ωe−rt + ρ
⎡
⎣q(1− u)− u
IZ
0
x(s(i))θ(i)m (θ(i)) di
⎤
⎦ (61)
The first-order conditions are
∂H
∂s(i)
=
∂H
∂θ(i)
= 0, ∀i[0, I], ∂H
∂u
= −ρ˙ (62)
The f.o.c. with respect to s (i) implies
⎡
⎣c0
⎛
⎝
IZ
0
s(i)di
⎞
⎠+ hθ(i)x0(s(i))
⎤
⎦ e−rt + ρx0(s(i))θ(i)m (θ(i)) = 0, ∀i[0, I] (63)
Similarly, the f.o.c. with respect to θ (i) implies
he−rt = −ρm (θ(i)) [1− α (θ(i))] , ∀i[0, I] (64)
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The Euler equation reads
⎡
⎣−y + z − c
⎛
⎝
IZ
0
s(i)di
⎞
⎠− h
IZ
0
θ(i)x(s(i))di
⎤
⎦ e−rt − ρ
⎡
⎣q +
IZ
0
x(s(i))θ(i)m (θ(i)) di
⎤
⎦ = −ρ˙
(65)
Equation (64) shows that θ(i) does not depend upon i, hence θ(i) = θu for all i ∈ [0, I]. Then,
eliminating ρ between (63) and (64) arrives at:
c0
⎛
⎝
IZ
0
s(i)di
⎞
⎠ = α (θ)
1− α (θ)hθx
0(s(i)) (66)
This equation shows that s(i) does not depend on i, hence s(i) = su, for all i ∈ [0, I]. This last
equation gives
c0 (Isu) =
α (θu)
1− α (θu)hθ
ux0(su) (67)
Diﬀerentiating (64) with respect to time, and taking the result at the stationary state (where
θ˙ = 0), entails ρ˙ = −rρ. The Euler equation (65) combined with (64) then gives
h
m (θu)
= (1− α (θu)) y − z + c (Is
u)
r + q + Ix(su)α (θu) θum (θu)
(68)
I Proof that there are no multiple oﬀers
Consider the function λ (w) defined over [R, y] such that λ is positive and continuous. Under
ubiquitous search, λ (w) = x [s (w)] θ (w)m [θ (w)]. Cut the interval [R, y] into n intervals of the
same length dw = (y −R) /n. Each interval is an island. On island i ∈ {1, ..., n}, there is a
unique wage wi = R+(i− 1) dw/n. Now, consider island i, and cut it into m intervals. Assume
that the probability to receive an oﬀer from any such interval is λidwdt/m over the period dt,
with λi = λ (wi).
Let Xi be the number of oﬀers received from island i over the period dt. The probability to
receive ki ∈ {0, ...,m} oﬀers is:
Pr (X = ki) = C
ki
m (λidwdt/m)
ki (1− λidwdt/m)m−ki (69)
As m→∞, it tends to
Pr (X = ki) = e−λidwdt
(λidwdt)
ki
ki!
(70)
Hence, Xi follows the Poisson law of parameter λidwdt.
Now, consider the random variable X =
nP
i=1
Xi which is the total number of oﬀers received
from all the islands over the period dt. As the diﬀerent variables are independent draws from
Poisson laws, the sum of the draws also follows a Poisson law, which parameter is the sum of
the parameters of the diﬀerent Poisson laws. Hence,
Pr (X = k) = Pr
Ã
nX
i=1
Xi = k
!
= e−λdt
(λdt)k
k!
, with λ =
nX
i=1
λidw (71)
31
As n → +∞, we obtain that X follows the Poisson law of parameter λ = lim
n→+∞
nP
i=1
λidw =R y
R λ(w)dw. The remaining of the proof is standard. Following Mortensen (1986),
Pr (X = k)
dt
= e−λdt
λk (dt)k−1
k!
(72)
The right-hand side tends to 0 when dt tends to 0 for all k > 1. Similarly, it tends to λ
when dt tends to 0 when k = 1. It follows that the probability to receive more than one oﬀer
conditional to the fact that the worker receives at least one oﬀer tends to 0 when dt tends to 0.
32
References
[1] Acemoglu, D., Shimer, R., 1999. Eﬃcient unemployment insurance. Journal of Political
Economy 107, 893-928
[2] Acemoglu, D., Shimer, R., 2000. Wage and technology dispersion. Review of Economic
Studies 67, 587-607
[3] Albrecht, J., Gautier, P., Vroman, S., 2005. Equilibrium directed search with multiple
applications. Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming
[4] Autor, D., Katz, L.F., 1999. Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3A, O. Ashenfelter and
D. Card eds, 1463-1555
[5] Burdett, K., Mortensen, D.T., 1998. Wage diﬀerentials, employer size, and unemployment.
International Economic Review 39, 257-273
[6] Charlot, O., Decreuse, B., Granier, P., 2005. Adaptability, productivity, and educational
incentives in a matching model. European Economic Review 49, 1007-1032
[7] Delacroix, A., Shi, S., 2005. Directed search on the job and the wage ladder. International
Economic Review, forthcoming
[8] Diamond, P., 1971. A model of price adjustment. Journal of Economic Theory 3, 156-168
[9] Galenianos, M., Kircher, P., 2006. Directed search with multiple applications. Mimeo
[10] Gautier, P., 2002. Unemployment and search externalities in a model of heterogeneous jobs
and workers. Economica 273, 21-40
[11] Hosios, A., 1990. On the eﬃciency of matching and related models of search and unemploy-
ment. Review of Economic Studies 57, 279-298
[12] Julien, B., Kennes, J., King, I., 2006. Ex-post pricing and eﬃcient coordination unemploy-
ment. Canadian Journal of Economics 38, 174-196
[13] Moen, E., 1997. Competitive search equilibrium. Journal of Political Economy 105, 385-411
[14] Montgomery, J., 1991. Equilibrium wage dispersion and interindustry wage diﬀerentials.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 163-179
[15] Moscarini, G., 2001, Excess worker reallocation, Review of Economic Studies 68, 593-612
[16] Moscarini, G., 2005, Job matching and the wage distribution, Econometrica 73, 481-516
[17] Mortensen, D.T., 2000. Equilibrium unemployment with wage-posting: Burdett-Mortensen
meet Pissarides. In H. Bunzel, B.J. Christiansen, P. Jensen, N.M. Kiefer and D.T.
Mortensen, eds., Panel data and structural labor market models, Amsterdam: Elsevier
[18] Pissarides, C., 2000. Equilibrium unemployment theory. MIT Press, 2nd ed
33
[19] Postel-Vinay, F., Robin, J.-M., 2002a. The distribution of earnings in an equilibrium search
model with state-dependent oﬀers and counteroﬀers. International Economic Review 43,
989-1016
[20] Postel-Vinay, F., Robin, J.-M., 2002b. Wage dispersion with worker and employer hetero-
geneity. Econometrica 70, 2295-2350
[21] Stigler, 1961. The Economics of information. Journal of Political Economy 69, 213-225
[22] Van den Berg, G., Ridder, G., 1998. An empirical equilibrium search model of the labor
market. Econometrica 66, 1183-1221
34
